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Abstract 
 
Thailand has proved that a well-fund, politically-supported public policy could be 
effective in preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS on a national scale. It is currently 
facing increased pressure to accept higher standards of intellectual property (IP) 
protection (the so-called TRIPS-Plus) under bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) 
proposed by the United States. The proposed US FTA threatens to restrict the 
measures the country can take to pursue affordable drugs, and will affect ability of 
Thailand to continue its successful ARV treatment and other healthcare programmes. 
The paper argues that the TRIPS-Plus regime generates a negative impact on poor 
people’s access to medicines, and the ARV treatment programme in Thailand is 
presented as an illustrative example. 
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TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property Rules: Impact on Thailand’s Public Health* 
Jakkrit Kuanpoth** 
 
Introduction 
 
Anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs have the potential to dramatically improve the health and 
extend the lives of many people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). However, the high 
price of these drugs put them out of reach of the vast majority of PLWHA in many 
developing countries. The problem is acute for example in Thailand, where HIV 
infection levels are high and public financial resources are limited. The importance of 
pharmaceutical pricing has become more crucial since the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is part of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) multilateral agreements, requires all member states, 
including developing countries, to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals and 
effectively enforce patent rights. In addition, the developing countries are now facing 
increased pressure toward higher standards of intellectual property (IP) protection (the 
so-called TRIPS-Plus), which appears in the form of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTA). 
 
Such high-level IP standards may be inappropriate for developing countries and 
would restrict access to essential medicines to fight HIV/AIDS and other pandemics. 
The fundamental question that faces the pharmaceutical world today is how best to 
provide drugs to the general population and how to do so cheaply. This note reviews 
some major issues relating to the controversial TRIPS-Plus rules under various FTAs 
that pose many challenges to the developing countries. The paper argues that the 
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TRIPS-Plus regime generates a negative impact on poor people’s access to medicines 
in general, and the ARV treatment programme in Thailand is presented as an 
illustrative example. 
 
 
1. Access to Medicines: Legal and Moral Rights 
 
i. Restricting access to medicine – violation of human rights 
 
The right to health has been recognized as a fundamental human rights. It is enshrined 
in a number of treaties, including the Constitution of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the United Nations Charter (Arts. 1, 55 and 56), the Universal Declaration on 
Human rights (Art.25), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art.24). The 
most important human rights instrument that explicitly recognizes the right to health 
is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
Article 12 of the ICESCR creates a legally binding right to health on the State, and 
Article 2 imposes legal obligations on all State parties to co-operate internationally to 
realize this right. 
 
The right to health was defined as “a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, 
goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable 
standard of health.” which includes “a system of urgent medical care in cases of 
accidents, epidemics and similar health hazards,” as well as “the provision of essential 
drugs” for prevalent diseases (UN Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 
2000: paras.9 and 12). This interpretation was reiterated in April 2001 when the 57th 
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Session of the United Nations Commission on Human rights adopted Resolution 
2001/33 on “Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS”, 
which confirmed that “access to medication in the context of HIV/AIDS is one 
fundamental element for achieving progressively the full realization of the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health” (UN Commission on Human rights 2001). 
 
ii. The right to health and access to medicine under the constitution 
 
Thailand ratified ICESCR on 5 September 1999, and under Article 12 it has an 
obligation to make sure that its people have access to pharmaceuticals and healthcare 
services. The right to health under international law is guaranteed by the Thai 
constitution. The 1997 Constitution, which is known as the people constitution, 
recognizes the right to health in Article 52. The constitutional right to health was 
outlined and implemented in the eighth National Economic and Social Development 
Plan and the National Plan for AIDS Prevention and Alleviation. The link between the 
national AIDS plan and the national development plan reflected the view of the Thai 
government that HIV/AIDS epidemic was not only a medical crisis, but also a threat 
to sustainable, social and economic development of the country. 
 
Thailand has to ensure that its law and policy will be supportive of public health 
policies which promote broad access to safe, effective and affordable medicines. The 
breach of state power by the introduction of the TRIPS-Plus rules under an FTA that 
would undermine Thailand’s substantive ability to deal with public health problems is 
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clearly a violation of the right to health of the Thai population, which is not only the 
constitutional right but also a legally-binding human rights obligation of Thailand. 
 
iii. The right to health and access to medicine under patent law 
 
The right to health is safeguard by various mechanisms, including those under the 
patent legislation. While the first patent law of Thailand, the Patent Act B.E. 2522, 
provides protection and exclusivity over pharmaceuticals, it ensures that the essential 
products will meet a domestic demand at reasonable and affordable prices by 
incorporating some possible legal measures to combat abusive practices and enforce 
local working of patents. The mechanisms include compulsory licensing and parallel 
import. 
 
The system of compulsory licensing is envisaged as a mechanism to improve free 
competition, and to authorize the use of patented article for public interest. A 
compulsory license may be granted to a private competitor or a State agency to use 
patented substances for meeting public needs. Both in the legal and economic context, 
it could make a compelling case for the grant of such license, or at least for 
threatening to do so should the patent holder not lower the prices of its products. 
Although the mechanism is important and can be used to enhance access to 
medicines, there are still practical difficulties in applying those provisions due to the 
incongruity of the Thai legal system and political pressure coming from the West. 
 
In December 1999 a group of PLWHA and NGOs staged a massive demonstration 
outside the the Ministry of Public Health demanding the use of compulsory licensing 
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of one important patented ARV drug, ddI (see further below). But this was not 
accepted by the Thai government which faced a great deal of hostility and threats 
from the United States government (Kuanpoth 2002: 344-345). Just as everywhere, 
political factors play an important part in the use of compulsory licensing in Thailand. 
One factor to reckon with seems to be the lack of political will by the Thai 
government to actually invoke the scheme of compulsory licensing in the public 
interest. 
 
The incorporation of the international exhaustion doctrine1 and the large variation in 
drug prices in the world market has led to the evolution of a marketing practice, called 
“parallel importing”, in which drugs sold in a country with low prices are exported to 
another country where prices are high at lower prices. While the pharmaceutical 
company tends to use legal rights under patents and other IP rights as territorial 
restrictions to enhance revenue, developing countries may adopt a policy of 
encouraging parallel import of foreign-made drugs in order to lower the price level of 
drugs in their local market (Maskus 2000). The possibility for the entry of foreign 
drugs into the domestic market will confront the licensed distributors with competitive 
pressure in setting prices (Abbott 1998; Beal 1998). 
 
In Thailand the principle of international exhaustion was incorporated into the patent 
law in 1999 in order to permit parallel importing of patented articles. While in 
principle compulsory licensing and parallel imports could enhance access to 
medicines, the use of these two mechanisms would be restricted by the introduction of 
TRIPS-Plus rules under an FTA that Thailand is negotiating with the US. 
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2. HIV/AIDS and ARV Treatment Programme in Thailand 
 
i. History and status of HIV/AIDS in Thailand 
 
The first case of HIV/AIDS was reported in Thailand in 1984. From 1984 to 2005, 
283,668 cases of HIV/AIDS were reported in Thailand, and there were 79,218 deaths 
because of the disease during the period. However, it has been estimated that the 
number of PLWHA in the country could be as high as 700,000 and that the number of 
death resulted from HIV/AIDS-related illnesses were 300,000. The rate of new 
infections is still high, estimated to be around 29,000 annually (UNDP 2004). 
 
The widespread transmission in Thailand occurred in the late 1980s. Between 1988 
and 1989, the rapid transmission of HIV was apparent among injecting drug-users 
who had tested with over 50 percent HIV prevalence in some provinces. During 1993 
to 1997, 8,325 cases were reported, but it was believed that HIV infections had been 
rapidly spread among sex workers. It was found that during the early 90s almost half 
of sex workers in Chiang Mai, a northern province of Thailand, were infected with 
HIV (Weniger et al 1991: S71). The high rate of infections among sex workers led to 
the rapid transmission of HIV/AIDS among the male clients of sex workers, and from 
infected males to their wives and partners, and their children. Now there are signs that 
HIV/AIDS has attained epidemic proportions among the general population, as 
evidenced by the increase in HIV positive diagnoses among military recruits and 
young people. For example, the rate of HIV infections among teenagers rose from 11 
percent in 2001 to 17 percent in the following year (UNDP 2004). 
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Women were heavily affected by the pandemic. At the early stage of the pandemic, 
around one-third of adults living with HIV/AIDS in Thailand were women, who were 
usually infected by their husband or boyfriend who had earlier acquired the virus 
during commercial sex. The number is rising as half of new adult infections are now 
occurring among women. The current figure shows that 70 percent of young people 
between the ages of 15 and 24 who are living with HIV/AIDS are girls and women 
(UNICEF 2004: 9). While the majority of HIV transmission in Thailand in the early 
1990s occurred between sex workers and their clients, around 50 percent of new 
infections are currently taking place between spouses (Thai Working Group on 
HIV/AIDS Projections 2001). The rate of HIV infection among pregnant women is 
relatively high and tends to be variable. From 0.5 percent in 1990, the number of HIV 
prevalence among women who get pregnant increased to 2.4 percent in 1995, but 
decreased to 1.18 and 1.09 in 2003 and 2004 respectively (UNDP 2004: 21). 
 
Women often face a disproportionate burden caring for sick family members or 
younger siblings, restricting their job or education opportunities. In many cases girls 
are much more likely to be withdrawn from school to perform caring tasks. 
 
 
ii. The Thai treatment programme against HIV/AIDS 
 
a) Preventive programme 
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Thailand’s initial efforts in tackling HIV/AIDS have proved remarkably successful 
(Piot 2001: 1106–1112). Comprehensive prevention campaigns adopted by the Thai 
government in the 1990s were the main factor that slowed down the rate of HIV 
infections. In response to AIDS epidemic in the early 1990s, the Thai government 
launched large-scale preventive action. In 1991, the Anand Administration declared 
that HIV/AIDS was a government priority. The National AIDS Prevention and 
Control Committee was set up and the AIDS control programme was moved from the 
Ministry of Public Health to the Office of the Prime Minister. The government also 
increased the 1993 budget for HIV/AIDS to US$ 44 million, almost a twenty-fold 
increase from the previous year (UNDP 2004: 16-17). The political commitment at 
the top level helped to mobilize not only financial resources but also a wide range of 
sectors of government and society to fight against HIV/AIDS. 
 
b) ARV treatment programme 
 
The initial policy response was limited to preventing the spread of the epidemic. 
Medical treatment was for the prevention of opportunistic infections only. No ARV 
treatment was provided to HIV-related patients at the early stage of the HIV/AIDS 
campaign. The Thai government subsequently realised that while preventing new HIV 
infections was crucial, it also needed to treat those who had already contracted the 
virus. 
 
In 1992, the Ministry of Public Health started to subsidize the ARV treatment 
programme which covered only a small number of PLWHA. At the beginning, mono-
ARV therapy (i.e. AZT or zidovudine) was provided. When this drug proved to be 
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inefficient and ineffective as the virus tended to mutate and became resistant to the 
medication, the Ministry of Public Health in 1995 switched to dual therapy (i.e. a 
combination of two ARV drugs), and two years later to triple drug therapy (i.e. a 
combination of three ARVs). 
 
In 2000, the Ministry of Public Health created a project “National Access to 
Antiretroviral Program for People living with HIV/AIDS” (NAPHA) which provided 
a wide range of triple drug ARV therapy. Under the project, around 400 public 
hospitals are dispensing ARV drugs to selected PLWHA. The committee bases its 
decision to select the HIV-related patients on medical grounds (e.g. a patient with a 
CD4 count of less than 200). The PLWHA selected by the committee will receive 
ARV drugs free of charge, which the Ministry of Public Health allocates to the 
hospitals based on a quota system. Each small state-funded hospital (i.e. a 60-bed 
hospital) receives ARV drugs for 20 persons at a time. Larger hospitals receive a 
quota of drugs for 40 persons. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the new constitution recognizes the people’s right to healthcare 
and social welfare which subsequently led to the introduction of the universal 
healthcare system. The health insurance system or the “30 baht” scheme, which 
currently covers approximately 95 percent of the population, was introduced in April 
2002 by the Thaksin Shinawatra government. The universal healthcare system, under 
which the poor and the uninsured persons are charged 30 baht per treatment at the 
government’s health service units, does not include ARV treatment, due to the 
country’s financial constraints and the high cost of drugs. As a result, only a very 
small percentage of Thai AIDS patients were receiving the drug therapy under the 
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government project. There are scant data on how many PLWHA in the country are 
actually receiving treatment, but it seems less than five percent of an estimated 
700,000 PLWHA have access to HIV treatment. 
 
c) Budgetary pressures 
 
A shortage of funds has been a major obstacle to HIV treatment programme in 
Thailand. The 1997 economic crisis had strong negative consequences on government 
programmes, budget and activities and led to a significant reduction and reorientation 
in the budget for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. While Thailand spent over 
1,418.5 million baht (US$ 37.3 million) on HIV/AIDS programmes in 1996, the 
government budget for HIV including funding for medical interventions such as ARV 
drugs and drugs for treatment of opportunistic infections was reduced to 1,099 million 
baht (US$ 28.9 million) in 2002 (Pothisiri, et al 1998). 
 
From the total HIV/AIDS budget, a modest amount is allocated for ARV therapy. The 
2003 ARV budget was 300 million baht (US$ 7.7 million), but increased to 800 
million baht (US$ 20.5 million) in 2004. The limited budget makes it impossible for 
the Ministry of Public Health to extend its ARV treatment programme to all PLWHA 
who require the drugs. 
 
d) Local production of generic ARV drugs 
 
In 2002, the Government Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO), the state enterprise 
under the Ministry of Public Health, successfully produced its first ARV cocktail 
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called GPO-vir. The drug, a fixed-dose combination of three drugs (stavudine, 
lamivudine and nevirapine), has become a cheap and affordable ARV treatment in 
Thailand. This success led the Thai government to announce that from January 2006 
onwards it would provide ARV drugs free of charge for 70,000 PLWHA through the 
government healthcare system. The Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria has 
also promised to allocate US$ 209 million for ARV treatment for 10,000 people in 
Thailand. With the funds from the government and the Global Fund, the government 
could achieve its target in providing treatment to 70,000 PLWHA (about 10 percent of 
PLWHA in Thailand) by the end of 2005 (Bangkok Post 2004). 
 
Despite having been unable to treat all PLWHA, Thailand’s ARV treatment 
programme can be regarded as a success. The achievement of Thailand in providing 
access to these drugs for a wider group of people stemmed from the fact that Thailand 
has been able to develop its healthcare systems and its drug-manufacturing base. The 
programme could be a model for other developing countries to tackle the HIV/AIDS 
crisis. 
 
 
iii. Benefits of the ARV treatment programme 
 
a) Treatment programme expanded 
 
At the early stage, most of the drugs distributed under NAPHA were branded drugs 
which cost more than 380,000 baht (US$ 10,000) per person per year, far beyond the 
limited government budget. Since the ARVs are now locally produced and sold at 
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much cheaper prices, the Ministry of Public Health has been able to expand its 
treatment programme significantly. For example, during 2001 to 2003 the HIV-
treatment programme was expanded more than eight-fold with only a 40 percent 
increase in budget. The number of people on ARV treatment also increased, reaching 
50,000 at the end of 2004 (UNAIDS and WHO 2004: 23). With the use of GPO-vir, 
which costs 1,200 baht (US$ 31) per patient per month compared to 18,620 baht (US$ 
490) per patient per month for the imported drugs, the Thai government would be able 
to meet its aim to provide affordable ARV treatment and treat 70,000 HIV-positive 
people and poor patients in the early 2006. 
 
While drug accessibility is not a complete solution to the problems posed by 
HIV/AIDS, access to affordable ARV therapy provides medical and social benefit to 
the HIV-infected people. It prolongs the lives of parents and extended families 
members, and in turn strengthens their ability to support their families and 
communities. Since ARV treatment reduces the discrimination and stigma associated 
with HIV/AIDS, it also creates an incentive for HIV testing which will enhance AIDS 
prevention and control efforts. 
 
b) Benefiting women 
 
Thailand was the first developing country that implemented a programme preventing 
mother-to-child HIV transmission (UNICEF 2004: 22) The programme has 
particularly positive outcomes for women, because the administration of ARV agents 
to mother and child around the time of birth may be the most effective means of an 
intervention to reduce viral transmission (Kanshana and Simonds 2002). The 
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programme, which currently runs under the 30-baht scheme, provides free ARV drugs 
and other health services to all HIV-positive women during pregnancy and their 
newborns. 
 
c) Benefiting foreign PLWHA 
 
Thailand has successfully developed its capability to produce cheaper ARVs. The 
GPO is currently able to supply a whole range of ARVs to its neighbouring countries 
(i.e. Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos). The poor patients in those countries 
benefit tremendously from Thailand’s capability in drug production, as they rely on 
Thailand as the significant source of cheap generic medicines (Kuanpoth and Duong 
2004). 
 
d) Obstacles remain 
 
While Thailand’s healthcare systems and its drug-manufacturing base benefit a wide 
group of people at home and abraod, there are still a large number of people who still 
miss out and do not have access to the essential medicines. Apart from the Thai 
PLWHA who are excluded from the government ARV treatment programme because 
of insufficient funds, the Thai government is still unable to fulfil its human rights 
obligation to treat foreign migrants who are HIV positive and require treatment. 
 
There are approximately more than one million immigrants working illegally in 
Thailand. Most migrant workers are from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, who cross 
over the border in search of work and trading opportunities. Among these, there are 
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girls and women drawn into the commercial sex industry, and those foreign sex 
workers are at significant risk of contracting the disease from their sexual activities. 
HIV prevalence among these women is likely to be higher than among their Thai 
counterparts. While the Thai government healthcare system is already serving the 
health needs of the local people, these illegal immigrants do not have access to health 
and other social services in Thailand and miss out on the ARV treatment programme. 
 
 
iv. Patents and prices of ARV medicines 
 
a) Patented ARV medicines in Thailand 
 
Access to medicines implies not only actual availability but also financial 
affordability. Affordable prices are fundamental for improving access to medicines. 
Although the prices of many ARVs have significantly fallen in recent years, they 
remain too high for Thailand. For example, the cost of a standard three-drug ARV 
regimen in Thailand in 2000 was 324,000 baht (US$ 8,100) per person per year. The 
total cost for providing AIDS drugs to all PLWHA could have been over US$ 8 
billion (UNDP 2004: 38). The high level of medicine prices stems from several 
factors. The most significant factors that lead to high drug prices are the lack of price 
competition, a non-transparent mark-up system, and the fact that health professionals 
and consumers prefer branded products instead of cheaper generics but alternative 
sources are not available for patented medicines. 
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Currently there are six triple drug ARV therapies being used under the Ministry of 
Public Health’s NAPHA programme. The drugs distributed in Thailand are listed 
below: 
1) GPO-vir (stavudine+lamivudine+nevirapine) 
2) d4T+3TC+EFV (stavudine+lamivudine+efavirenz) 
3) AZT+3TC+NVP (zidovudine+lamivudine+nevirapine) 
4) AZT+3TC+EFV (zidovudine+lamivudine+efavirenz) 
5) d4T+3TC+IDV/RTV (stavudine+lamivudine+indinavir/ritonavir) 
6) AZT+3TC+IDV/RTV (zidovudine+lamivudine+indinavir/ritonavir) 
 
In the six triple drug therapies, there are seven ARVs (different chemical entities). As 
of December 2005, only two chemical entities (i.e. efavirenz and indinavir) are 
patented in Thailand. One formulation (i.e. GPO-vir) is under a petty patent, which is 
owned by the GPO. There are no patents over lamivudine, nevirapine, ritonavir, 
stavudine, and zidovudine. The lack of patents on the majority of ARV drugs makes it 
possible for the GPO to produce cheaper generic medicines. For example GPO-vir 
pills can be produced because stavudine, lamivudine and nevirapine are not under 
patents in Thailand. The Thai government can run its ARV treatment programme 
successfully as it can obtain the generic versions of the drugs at much cheaper prices 
than the ones offered by the multinationals. 
 
b) Second-line drugs – worsening impact 
 
It may be noted that all the drugs currently distributed under the ARV treatment 
programme are WHO-recommended first-line ARVs most of which are non- patented 
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as they have been on the market for some time. The government programme will face 
difficulties in the future when the Ministry of Public Health has to switch a large 
percentage of patients to considerably more expensive second-line therapy if patients 
become allergic to the first-line drugs or when the HIV virus becomes resistant to the 
current drugs. 
 
A search in the Department of Intellectual Property database found that several WHO-
recommended second-line drugs are under patent protection in Thailand. Only two of 
seven second-line drugs (i.e. abacavir and ritonavir) are not patented. Three important 
second-line ARVs (i.e. didanosine, lopinavir, and lopinavir/ritonavir) are all under 
patents. The search could not confirm whether or not two compounds (i.e. tenofovir 
and saquinavir) are patented. They may be patented or have patents pending in 
Thailand. Assuming they are the subject of pending applications, five out of seven 
WHO-recommended second-line ARVs could become patented in Thailand in the 
near future. 
 
When the Ministry of Public Health needs to dispense those patented drugs, it will 
significantly raise the cost of the ARV treatment programme as the production and 
importation of generic drugs would not be possible. Available data indicate that the 
prices of branded and patented ARVs are generally much higher than those offered by 
the generic companies. For example, the prices of two non-patented first line ARVs 
currently used by the Ministry of Public Health (i.e. lamivudine and stavudine) are 
considerably lower than those offered by the originator companies. While the 
originator’s lamivudine 150 mg and stavudine 40 mg are priced at 6,046 baht (US$ 
159) per 60 capsules and 5,660 baht (US$ 148) per 60 capsules respectively, the same 
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drugs are available in the same quantities from the GPO at much cheaper prices: 600 
baht (US$ 15.60) for lamivudine and 270 baht (US$ 7.10) for stavudine. 
 
As regards the patented drugs , the price differentiation is much greater. For example, 
lopinavir/ritonavir 113.3/33.3mg, a WHO-recommended second-line ARV, is sold in 
Thailand by the originator company at 17,762 baht (US$ 467) per 180 capsules, while 
the same drugs could be imported from an Indian generic company at the price of 
5,930 baht (US$ 156). 
 
Since the cost of the branded ARV drugs is beyond reach for Thailand, without the 
capability to produce generic ARV drugs the Thai government’s treatment 
programme could not have lasted long. The experience of Thailand in the production 
of generic drugs, particularly GPO-vir, has demonstrated that generic production and 
competition can reduce drug prices to well below those charged by multinational 
pharmaceutical companies. The Thai government should apply all possible legal 
options currently available under the patent law such as compulsory licensing to 
enhance generic competition, particularly for second-line ARV drugs which are under 
patent protection in Thailand. In an attempt to do this, Thailand has to keep in mind 
that the TRIPS-Plus rules would preclude its ability to enforce compulsory licensing 
and it should not accept any TRIPS-Plus provision that might be proposed in the FTA 
negotiation. 
 
 
v. Patents on ARV didanosine (ddI) 
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Didanosine (ddI) is one of the anti-retroviral drugs that WHO recommends for 
HIV/AIDS treatment. The drug when used with zidovudine and lamivudine, has been 
proved to be an effective reverse transcriptase inhibitor against the disease, especially 
for patients intolerant to zidovudine, or in whom zidovudine has failed. The ddI drug 
was developed in the US by two scientists working for the National Institute of 
Health, a US public research institution. In 1989, two patents (US 4861759 and US 
5616566) were issued by the US Patent Office to ddI substance. The owner of the 
patents is the Department of Health and Human Services. The patents on ddI were 
then licensed to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), a company incorporated in Delaware, 
to produce and market the product worldwide under the trademark ‘Videx’. A patent 
application was filed by BMS with the Department of Intellectual Property of 
Thailand on 7 July 1992 for the ddI drug. It was claimed in the application that the 
invention related to pharmaceutical components providing the improved oral dosing 
formulations of ddI. The claims were directed to the method of adding buffer (antacid) 
that provides special advantages for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. 
 
The patent application that was filed in Thailand claimed the drug dosage, which was 
limited to 5-100 mg of ddI per dose. In 1997, after the application was published, 
BMS requested the Department of Intellectual Property to amend its application. The 
amendment was aimed at removing the limitation on the dosage range mentioned in 
the claims. The Department of Intellectual Property approved the request for 
amendment and in January 1998 a patent covering all dosage forms of ddI was 
granted to the company.2 
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In May 2001, the AIDS Access Foundation, which is an NGO, and two Thai HIV 
patients filed a lawsuit against BMS and the Department of Intellectual Property 
seeking an amendment to the descriptions of the scope of the claims in the patent 
pertaining ddI. It was alleged that the patent was wrongly and unlawfully granted for 
ddI formulation. The plaintiffs asserted that the decision to allow amendment of the 
application strengthened the company’s ddI manufacturing rights more than what it 
initially claimed. It was also alleged that the Department of Intellectual Property’s 
decision in allowing amendment of the application was wrong and violated the law 
and regulation, because the amendment had widened the scope of the invention and 
gave wider exclusive rights than the company was entitled to. 
 
The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court of Thailand ruled on 2 
October 2002 against BMS and the Department of Intellectual Property calling the 
amendment ‘unlawful’. The court ordered the Department of Intellectual Property to 
revoke the invalid claims and restore the original limits to formulation in the patent. 
The judgment of the court resulted in the company’s exclusive rights being limited to 
5-100 mg per unit, which permitted anyone to produce generic versions of ddI tablets 
greater than 100 mg without infringing the patent rights held by BMS. Both BMS and 
the Department of Intellectual Property appealed the decision. 
 
On 9 October 2002, a second lawsuit was filed by the Foundation for Consumer 
Protection of Thailand and three HIV patients against BMS and the Department of 
Intellectual Property. This time the AIDS activists sought revocation of the 
company’s patent. The plaintiffs asserted that the grant of the patent for the ddI 
formulation was unlawful because the invention was not new. They also argued that 
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the idea of adding buffer (antacid) to create an improved pharmaceutical formulation 
in order to reduce acid in stomach and facilitate the oral dosage was obvious to any 
professional in the field. They also said that the patent covering the ddI formulation 
was an obvious development of an existing product, rather than an original therapeutic 
idea. Both lack of novelty and obviousness are a standard legal argument against 
patent exclusivity under Thai law (Patent Act B.E. 2522, Secs.5 and 54). 
 
Before the trial of the second case began, the company sought settlement with the 
plaintiffs. After several rounds of negotiation, an amicable agreement was reached 
and signed by BMS and representatives of the Foundation for Consumers and the 
three HIV patients. The company agreed to surrender all its exclusive marketing rights 
under the ddI patent in Thailand and withdrew its appeal in the first lawsuit in 
exchange for the dropping of the second lawsuit by the plaintiffs (Kuanpoth 2006). 
 
 
3. International Trade Regulation and Its Impacts on Access to Medicines 
 
i. TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and access to medicines 
 
The TRIPS Agreement established a new area of trade regulation in the WTO. It 
contains new multilateral rules and disciplines with minimum substantive standards of 
IP protection that all WTO Members must implement. WTO Members are required to 
provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals, but high levels of protection are 
balanced by various legal measures that WTO Members may take if IP rights are 
abused. The feasible options include: compulsory licensing and government use 
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(TRIPS, Art. 31), parallel importing (Art.6), exception to exclusive patent right such 
as research exemption, Bolar provision, prior users’ rights, etc. (Art.30), and 
competition law and policy (Correa 2000). 
 
TRIPS requires patent protection for pharmaceutical products and processes, and a 
number of developing countries have expressed increasing concern that exclusivity 
under patents is leading to substantially higher drug prices, with adverse effects on 
healthcare services (WHO 2000). The experiences of some countries (e.g. South 
Africa, Thailand, and Brazil) regarding the actual impacts of patent rights on access to 
medicines, led to the issuance by the WTO of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (WTO Ministerial Conference 2001; Correa 2002). The 
Doha Declaration, which was adopted on 14 November 2001, expresses concern of 
Member countries over “the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.” 
 
It stipulates that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.” It goes on to recognize that WTO Members are 
free to use the flexibilities under TRIPS, such as compulsory licensing, in order to 
promote access to medicines, and are free to determine the grounds upon which to 
issue compulsory licenses. 
 
The Doha Declaration instructed the WTO Council for TRIPS to recommend a 
solution to the problem faced by countries with insufficient or no manufacturing 
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capacities. The problem concerns Articles 31(f) and (h) of the TRIPS Agreement 
which permits Members to grant compulsory licenses to supply foreign markets but 
limits exports to less than half of production and requires payment of adequate 
remuneration to the patent holder when such licenses are issued. It also instructed the 
Council for TRIPS to recommend a solution to the problem faced by countries with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities, which led to the decision by the WTO 
General Council in December 2005 to amend the TRIPS Agreement permitting a 
production for export under a compulsory license and waiving the payment 
requirement in the eligible importing Member (WTO General Council Decision 
2005). 
 
 
ii. The proposed Thai-US free trade agreement and TRIPS-Plus rules 
 
The early 2000s saw the proliferation of FTA, which arose after some WTO Member 
countries became impatient with slow progress in multilateral trade negotiations. 
Since trade liberalization was getting more difficult under the WTO framework, some 
developed country governments, particularly the US government, have used bilateral 
and regional trade fora to achieve what they could not in the multilateral WTO forum 
(enforcing inflexible high level IP protection in developing countries). 
 
In 2002, the US Congress passed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
2002 giving the Executive branch fast track authority to conclude bilateral 
agreements. Since then, the US has negotiated and is negotiating an FTA with a 
number of countries including Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, the Southern 
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Africa Customs Union (SACU) countries, and Singapore. It is also negotiating FTA 
with Thailand along with many other countries. 
 
The US offers the trade partners concessions in core trade areas like agriculture, 
textile and other market access preferences in exchange for higher standards for IP 
protection. US FTA generally includes an IP Chapter containing TRIPS-Plus 
standards that goes beyond what is already included in the TRIPS Agreement. The 
TRIPS-Plus provisions in the FTAs signed by the US are of a comprehensive nature. 
They concern all areas of IP such as patents, trademarks and copyright. On patents, 
TRIPS-Plus rules generally contain: 
• Inclusion of new areas of IP (e.g. patenting of life forms, data exclusivity); 
• Implementation of a more extensive IP standard (e.g. extension of patent 
and copyright terms); 
• Limiting flexibilities that countries have under TRIPS (e.g. restricting the 
right of governments to allow the production, marketing, and import of 
generic medicines); 
• Requiring the parties to the FTA to ratify or accede to a host of WIPO 
treaties (e.g. the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the UPOV Convention, WIPO 
internet treaties). 
 
When the USTR submitted the draft IP text to Thailand in the sixth round of FTA 
negotiations in January 2006, TRIPS-Plus provisions appeared in the US proposed 
text (available at: http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=3677). If Thailand 
signs such an FTA with the US, the TRIPS-Plus commitment would have negative 
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implications for access to medicines in Thailand, especially the country’s successful 
ARV treatment programme, as the following discussions suggest. 
 
a) Patents for any new uses or methods of using a known product 
 
The text of the USTR IP proposal requires Thailand to protect second uses, new use 
of products already known or existing in the market. For example, Thailand must 
allow the claim to a new use of an old drug or the claim to a new therapeutic 
application of the known drug. Given that a single medical product can have multiple 
uses and formulations, providing patents for the subsequent uses or the new 
composition of a known drug would allow “evergreening” (i.e. granting patents for 
trivial inventions) which unnecessarily prolongs the monopolistic market enjoyed by 
the patent holder and deprive consumers of the right to essential medicines. 
 
b) Restricting compulsory licensing 
 
The USTR text introduces language that would undermine the ability of Thailand to 
make use of compulsory licensing as a means to obtain differentially priced generic 
medicines. For example, it confines circumstances under which compulsory licenses 
may be issued to three circumstances only, namely (i) to remedy anti-competitive 
practices, (ii) in the case of public non-commercial use, and (iii) in the case of 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. The issuance of 
compulsory licenses in other circumstances than those mentioned above (e.g. issuing a 
compulsory license in case of non-working or insufficient working of patents) is not 
permissible. 
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In the case of public non-commercial use, national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency, the USTR text provided that a compulsory license can be granted 
only in accordance with these conditions: 
• A compulsory license can be issued only to the public sector or third 
parties authorised by the government. 
• The patent holder shall receive full compensation under the TRIPS 
provision for compulsory licensing. 
• There must be no requirement for the transfer of undisclosed information 
or for the disclosure of know-how without the consent of the right holder. 
 
The constraints which might be imposed on Thailand threaten to restrict the measures 
it can take to pursue affordable drugs. Thailand’s signing an FTA with the US would 
result in limited access to medicines not only in Thailand but also in its neighbouring 
countries like Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, which have been relying on 
Thailand as an important source of drug supply. The TRIPS-Plus provision would 
prevent Thailand from issuing a compulsory license and exporting the compulsorily 
licensed drugs to those countries that have no or insufficient capacity in drug 
production, denying their rights as reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health (Abbott 2004). 
 
c) Prohibiting pre-grant opposition and revocation of patents 
 
The USTR text prohibits Thailand from allowing pre-grant opposition to a patent. The 
effectiveness of the patent system primarily depends on the quality of the technical 
 27 
examination. In developed countries, it is not uncommon to find a number of invalid 
patents being issued each year (Sherwoon et al 1999). In view of the weaker patent 
examination system, it is thus logical to assume that the number of invalid patents 
granted in the developing countries like Thailand is even higher (Tanasugarn 1999). 
The case of ddI discussed earlier reflects the policy significance of the pre-grant 
opposition procedure which permits the invalidation or amendment of patents before 
the patent office examination. A straightforward administrative procedure is necessary 
because it allows the patentee’s competitors to challenge the validity of the patent at 
relatively low cost prior to an infringement action. The system also reduces the 
excessive burden on the court and contributes to speedy proceedings of patent 
invalidation. 
 
The US text also prevents Thailand from revoking patents on grounds other than those 
that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent (e.g. lack of patentability, 
insufficiency of or unauthorised amendments to the patent specification, non-
disclosure or misrepresentation of prescribed, material particulars, fraud, or 
misrepresentation). Revocation cannot be undertaken in the cases of abuses of patent 
rights or non-working which are generally the cause of high drug prices, despite of the 
fact that the revocation of patents is permissive under the Paris Convention and the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
 
d) Extending patent term 
 
Extension of patent term is another type of restriction found in FTAs concluded by the 
US. The TRIPS-Plus standards require patent term extension beyond the twenty years 
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of TRIPS due to a delay caused by regulatory approval processes or by the granting of 
a patent. Extending the patent term would delay the potential introduction of 
affordable generic medicines and defer the day when consumers can reap the benefit 
of generic competition. 
 
e) Data exclusivity 
 
A company that seeks registration of medicines must submit test data (i.e. data 
relating to the drug’s quality, safety and efficacy) to the national drug regulatory 
authority (Correa 2002). Like all US FTAs, the USTR text requires Thailand to 
enforce data exclusivity, which prevents the national drug regulatory authority from 
using the originator’s clinical test data for a period of 5 years (in the case of new 
medicines) or 3 years (for the new use of old products) from initial regulatory 
approval of the original product. The drug regulatory authority is prevented from 
granting market approval to generic drugs on the basis of bio-equivalence or on the 
fact that the original product has got a marketing approval in a foreign country. This 
provision would delay generic drugs entering the market, as generic companies would 
have to enter a long and costly testing process and complete the registration trials 
before the marketing approval of a generic drug can be obtained. It may also restrain 
the effectiveness of the compulsory licensing system, potentially preventing the drug 
regulatory authority from registering the generic drug produced under the compulsory 
license. Thailand would be inhibited from using compulsory licensing to gain access 
to lower priced medicines. 
 
f) Linkage of drug registration and the patent status of a drug 
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The text that the USTR has proposed to Thailand contains a provision obligating the 
Thai drug regulatory authority to inform the patent holder as to any attempt to register 
a generic drug. The linkage of drug registration with the patent status would impose 
unnecessary burden on the drug authority and unnecessarily restrain the entry of 
generic medicines. The TRIPS Agreement makes it very clear that IP rights, including 
patents, are private rights. The owner of the rights must protect its own interests, not 
the State. The practice of linking patent status to registration obviously provides legal 
protection for IP rights that are much stronger than any other rights of the private 
party. This sort of proposal therefore should be rejected by Thailand. 
 
g) Trade marks 
 
TRIPS-Plus provisions introduced by the US also impose a high level of trade mark 
protection. Under US FTAs, “trade mark” is defined in the broadest manner, including 
non-visually perceptible trade marks, such as scent marks. Sound, texture and smell 
could be registered as trade marks. The new trade mark rule would allow the 
pharmaceutical companies to create “brand loyalty” for their trade marks and brand 
names associated with the patented medicines by using intense advertisement and 
sophisticated marketing techniques. The monopolistic market based on the trademark 
and consumer loyalty will continue after the expiration of the patent, and will restrict 
the introduction of generic competition which leads to price reductions on branded 
medicines. 
 
h) Linkage of IP rights and investment 
 30 
 
FTAs introduced by the US also advance the liberalization of investment measures by 
restricting the sovereign right of states to regulate foreign investments. For example, 
some US FTAs prohibit the host governments from imposing performance 
requirements (US-Singapore FTA, Art.15.8). Expropriation or other measures 
tantamount to expropriation are prohibited except when such measures are taken in 
the public interest, on a non-discriminatory basis, against payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law. 
Compensation would have to be paid without delay, equal the fair market value of the 
investment before the expropriation occurred, and be fully conceivable and freely 
transferable (US-Singapore FTA, Art.15.6.2). The US FTAs also incorporate 
provisions for investor-to-state dispute settlement that allows private investors to sue 
the host state directly in international dispute tribunals for monetary compensation for 
government policies or actions judged by the tribunal to be in breach of the treaty 
obligations and to undermine an investor’s future profits (US-Singapore FTA, Sec.C: 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement). 
 
FTAs also link the protection of IP with investment protection by including IP rights 
in the definition of investment (US-Singapore FTA, Art.15.1.13(f)). The linkage 
between IP rights and investment would inhibit Thailand to regulate its economy or 
protect its citizens. For example, US FTAs generally specify that when a compulsory 
license is issued in compliance with the FTA provisions, which are generally more 
restrictive than the TRIPS Agreement, it does not violate the investment chapter’s 
limitation on expropriation. That means if the issuance of the compulsory license is a 
violation of the FTA IP chapter (even though it is in compliance with TRIPS), the 
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patent holder can directly sue the host government in a special trade tribunal for 
compensation (US-Singapore FTA, Art.15.6.5). The patent holder can claim much 
higher compensation than reasonable royalties in case of compulsory licensing under 
the TRIPS IP rules, as the investment chapter under FTAs requires compensation to 
be the full market value of a patent. The prospect of paying high compensation to the 
patent holder would undoubtedly discourage developing country governments from 
issuing compulsory licenses to protect public health. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
HIV/AIDS is devastating many developing countries on a scale unseen in recent 
history. Thailand has proved that a well-fund, politically-supported public policy 
could be effective in preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS on a national scale. The 
comprehensive prevention programmes adopted by the Thai government have saved 
millions of lives, significantly reducing the number of new HIV infections. The Thai 
case also demonstrates the important of generic competition to maintain low price 
levels and thus makes medicines available and affordable. This in turn means that 
TRIPS flexibilities are crucial to increase such competition. Any attempt to limit the 
use of such flexibilities would have significant impacts on accessibility to the vital 
medicines. The TRIPS-Plus rules are proposed by US pharmaceutical industries, who 
give no thought to HIV-infected patients in developing countries who need the 
medicines most direly. Those companies are pursuing the higher level of protection 
not to increase research and development, but to limit generic competition in order to 
increase their profits. 
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Thailand unquestionably possesses the manufacturing capacity to produce the generic 
ARVs. Such capacity will allow Thailand to take advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities 
to get affordable treatment for its growing HIV/AIDS population. However the 
constraints under the proposed US FTA threaten to restrict the measures the country 
can take to pursue affordable drugs, and will affect ability of Thailand to continue its 
ARV treatment and other healthcare programmes. Thailand must be aware that it has 
obligation to ensure the realization of the right to health, which means any increase in 
IP protection must be balanced by the right of access to healthcare and essential 
medicines. In order to make ARV treatment affordable for the most vulnerable groups 
in the country and comply with the right to health under the international human 
rights instruments that Thailand adheres, generic competition must be upheld and the 
Thai government must reject the TRIPS-Plus rules proposed by the US. 
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1 When the patented drug has been sold by the right holder or with his consent, the patent 
holder cannot prohibit the subsequent import or resale of the product because his rights to the 
product have been exhausted by the act of selling it. This is known as “the principle of 
exhaustion of rights”. Countries may implement this principle differently. Some may apply 
the principle when drugs are sold within the national border only (called national exhaustion), 
but other countries, notably the European Union, allow no restrictions on import when drugs 
are put on sale in members of the community (called regional exhaustion). Many countries 
currently adopt the principle of international exhaustion of rights, whereby the patent rights 
are exhausted after the first marketing of the patented article by the right holder or with his 
consent, regardless of the place of marketing. 
 
2 Thai patent law provides for examination of the patent applications as to substance. In 
practice, due to limited resources and facilities, the Department of Intellectual Property hardly 
conducts patent search and examination, but simply grants patents in pursuant to the 
examination result in a foreign country. In other words, the Thai patent office always accepts 
the search and examination results obtained by a foreign patent office, particularly those of 
the developed countries who are considered more capable of thoroughly examine 
applications. 
